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ncentives and accountability for
government performance have become
so central to contemporary government
reform agendas across the globe that
public management scholars have
proclaimed a new era of “government by
performance management” (Moynihan
and Pandey 2005, p. 422). Elements of
these recent reforms include establishing
performance measures and standards
to facilitate increased accountability
to the public, pay for performance,
organization-wide performance bonuses,
and competitive performance-based
contracting; reducing “red tape” and
promoting more transparent management;
and devolving government functions
and incentivizing innovation. A core
objective of incorporating performance
measures and standards into public
sector incentive systems is to create clear
expectations for government performance
(while loosening the reins of bureaucratic
control) and allow for overt assessment
of results. If they are to be more than
data collection exercises, however,
performance management systems
also need to incorporate a means for
incentivizing or rewarding individuals,
teams, or entire organizations for their
achievements relative to performance
goals.
In the United States, performance
standards systems and bonuses are (or
have been) used in Food Stamps and
welfare-to-work programs, employment
and training programs, child welfare
agencies and child support enforcement
programs, Medicaid and SCHIP
programs, and other social programs.
Performance incentive systems in public
bureaucracies are also advancing in
Europe and other parts of the world, with
some governments such as Australia
and the Netherlands now implementing
incentive systems with fully (100
percent) performance-contingent pay and
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contracting arrangements (Finn 2008;
Struyven and Steurs 2005) As the use
of performance measures and incentive
systems has expanded in the public
sector, so has the number of studies
calling attention to their challenges
and unintended effects, although there
is relatively little rigorous empirical
evidence of their implications for
government outcomes.
Among the earliest introductions
of incentive systems in government
agencies was the Job Training Partnership
Act (JTPA) performance standards
system in 1982, described by Klerman
(2005, p. 347) as one of the “most mature
implementations of performance-based
management.” It is also one of the most
studied systems, in part because of the
randomized experimental evaluation
of the JTPA program that produced
important information for assessing
the performance of this performance
standards system. Policymakers have
looked to the results of these studies to
inform and guide changes in the design
and operation of performance standards
systems in other government programs,
as well as to improve these systems in
the Workforce Investment Act (WIA)
programs that replaced JTPA.
At the same time, one of the
motivations for assembling the research
presented in our new book, The
Performance of Performance Standards
(published by the Upjohn Institute),
is that despite decades of study and
practice, some of the important lessons
that have been learned do not appear to
be reflected in the current design and
implementation of performance standards
systems. Bevan and Hood (2006, p. 7),
for example, describe the development
and use of performance targets in the
English public health care system,
along with the perverse incentives they
generated, as “hitting the target and
missing the point.”

It may be that some of the empirical
evidence from past studies has not
been effectively communicated or
penetrated policymaking and public
management circles deeply enough. Or
it may be that some of the fundamental
lessons have been ignored or deferred
in pursuit of other objectives (political
or otherwise). Or, as James Heckman
and Jeffrey Smith comment, it may be
that policymakers who have mandated
such systems (and administrators
involved in their implementation) have
not fully appreciated the challenges of
designing a performance management
system that generates incentives for
improving performance and impacts.
For example, even if a government
designed a performance management
system that initially suggested a strong
correlation between performance
measures and desired outcomes, over
time, its effectiveness may decline as
program managers learn how to game
the measures and other limitations of
the measures and system design become
known.
The essays we present use U.S.
employment and training programs as a
“laboratory” for investigation. Drawing
on a variety of data sources on these
incentives systems, we explore how
performance standards and incentives
affect the behavior of public managers
and agency employees, their approaches
to service delivery, and ultimately, the
outcomes for participants. Both the
JTPA and WIA programs have allowed
state and local administrators and their
governing boards substantial discretion,
within broad limits, to determine
performance goals, standards, and bonus
systems. This administrative flexibility
is reflected in the range of incentive
systems that states have implemented
over time. It is this variation in incentive
systems among states that serves as the
grist for our empirical mill and is used to
extract general lessons that can be applied
on a wider scale to both existing and
newly developing performance incentive
systems.
In our investigation of formal
incentive structures and organizational
behavior within U.S. employment
and training programs, we focus
on the following questions that are
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broadly applicable to any public sector
performance management and incentive
system:
• How do performance standards
and measures operate to include or
exclude individuals with different
characteristics in public programs?
• How do performance standards and
measures affect the types of public
services offered and received?
• How do the processes for setting
standards and weights for
performance goals and for recognizing
and rewarding performance affect
system incentives and bureaucratic
responses?
• Are the performance standards,
measures, and incentives effective
in motivating bureaucratic behavior
toward the achievement of program
goals?
• Do short-term outcome measures used
in performance standards systems
predict long-term impacts of programs
on participants?
• What problems or unintended effects
are associated with the design and
implementation of performance
standards systems in the public sector?
• What other lessons do we learn from
the implementation of performance
standards systems and the variation in
rules and guidelines governing their
administration over time?
In undertaking research to address
the questions above, we were fortunate
to have access to data superior in scope
and detail to much of the data used in
the existing literature or available on
a regular basis for assessing program
performance. Our research benefitted
from detailed longitudinal, microlevel
data that were collected in the National
JTPA Study (NJS) and through other
administrative data sources. In addition,
we collected and analyzed complete
information about state-level variation in
the JTPA and WIA performance standards
systems. We show that state incentive
systems are highly complex and differ
widely across states and over time within
states, and are not easily characterized
by small dimensional summary measures
as used in previous studies. This wealth
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of data, to which we applied a variety of
analytical/empirical strategies, is essential
in assessing the implications of features
and changes in performance standards
and incentive systems in different
contexts and across time.
The broad findings and lessons that we
draw from this research are as follows.
First, individuals and organizations
respond to incentives, but sometimes
the responses are perverse. In the first
iteration of a performance standards
system’s design, well-meaning designers
of the system are unlikely to fully
anticipate the responses of program
administrators and frontline workers to
system incentives, or the many possible
ways they might influence measured
performance without necessarily adding
to (or possibly even detracting from)
program value or impact. Incentive
system designers will have to expect
to regularly review and revise the rules
and incentives they create if they want
to avoid inefficient and unintended
responses.
Second, the short-term outcome
measures that are commonly used in
performance standards systems are
only weakly related to the true long-run
impacts of the programs. Researchers
and policymakers have yet to identify
performance measures that will promote
key, long-term program objectives while
simultaneously generating more readily
available performance information for
ongoing program management. This will
continue to be one of the most vexing
challenges for performance standards
system designers for some time to come.
Third, the “cream-skimming” issue,
or concern about the trade-off between
efficiency and equity in access to
programs, has been overstated. While
there is some evidence of a trade-off
between serving the most disadvantaged
and allocating program resources most
efficiently, it appears to be modest at
best. Personal choices and informational
constraints play a more important
role in accounting for demographic
differences in program participation
than administrative discretion, and thus,
program administrators should consider
investing more in increasing awareness
among the eligible population.

Clearly, demand on the part of
policymakers or the public for greater
accountability and a results-oriented
government is not diminishing.
The design and implementation of
performance standards and incentive
systems in the public sector will continue
to be a dynamic pursuit, and it is our hope
that the lessons distilled in this volume
will have a role in shaping and speeding
their evolution, as well as in ultimately
improving government performance.
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